



keep your promise!
CAMPAIGN



African Civil Society

POSITION

UNFCCC-COP28



COP28 UAE

PREAMBLE

This Position is inspired by the struggles waged by people at the frontline of climate crisis – women, youth, indigenous peoples, smallholder farmers, pastoralists, fisher folk, hunters and gatherers, Workers, Trade Unions – whose voices have been obscured by ruthlessly aggressive fossil fuel, carbon-addicted Transnational Corporations and a section of right-wing governments, in-ill-intentioned on self-preservation and capturing the UNFCCC to serve their parochial and capitalist interests.

It strongly draws from the latest scientific reports, the IPCC's 6th Assessment report, UNEP's 2023 Adaptation Gap Report and Climate finance reports and proclamations. It's a cumulative consolidation of views, reflections and Statements/Communiqués from more than 2000 representatives from diverse backgrounds, who participated in convenings hosted by PACJA and its sectoral-thematic Partners throughout the year, notably:

- ◆ African Civil Society Statement to the 36th African Union Summit Addis Ababa, 15 and 16 February 2023
- ◆ African Civil Society Communiqué on the Green Climate Fund's Second Replenishment (GCF-2) Niamey, Niger: February 26, 2023
- ◆ Africa's CSOs Call on Global Community to Act Fast and Make Loss and Damage Facility Operational with Adequate and Highly Accessible Funding, A communiqué from Africa Regional Symposium on Loss and Damage, Lilongwe Malawi, April 5, 2022
- ◆ Resolutions and Recommendations from the Second Ordinary Session of the Sixth Parliament, focusing on the outcome of Pan African Parliamentarians Summit on Climate Policy & Equity; Midrand, South Africa, May 16&17, 2023
- ◆ Nineteenth Session of The African Conference on the Environment (AMCEN19) African Civil Society Submission; Addis Ababa, August 11, 2023
- ◆ The Common Africa Position on Climate Change & Health 'Exploiting the potential of One Health Approach for Low-Carbon, Climate Resilient Health Systems in Africa' Lilongwe, Malawi: August 24, 2023
- ◆ Africa Climate Summit 2023, Non-State Actors (NSAs) Demands and Redlines, September 2023
- ◆ Eleventh Conference on Climate Change and Development in Africa Green Growth and Climate Finance Solutions for Africa and the World Nairobi, Kenya, 1-3 September 2023
- ◆ African Civil Society's Marrakech Declaration on Climate Finance Marrakesh, Morocco, October 08, 2023
- ◆ Perspectives from multiple convening of consultations involving Non-State Actors representing diverse interests across Africa, notably young people, women, indigenous people, African private sector, civil societies, farmers organizations, and faith actors among interest groups
- ◆ Collectivizing view from multiple consultations among non-state actors during the Africa Climate Summit, engagement with the new CEO of the GCF, our multi-stakeholder process on locally-led climate action, ministerial dinner on health and climate change among other events
- ◆ Inaugural Conference on Accelerating Agricultural Adaptation in Africa: *Advancing Political Leadership, Multi-sectoral Approaches and Climate Financing for a Resilient Agriculture in Africa in the Face of Climate Crisis, Abuja, Nigeria: October 18, 2023*
- ◆ Synthesising perspectives and voices emerging from communities in different countries across Africa from the Keep Your Promise Campaign

PREMISES

Six overarching principles guide this statement:

1. Our stand by the principles of climate justice, human rights, gender equality, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and respective capabilities and intergenerational equity in all climate policies and actions
2. Our sustained rejection of false solutions and narratives that undermine African communities' rights, interests and sovereignty, such as carbon markets, geoengineering, nuclear energy, and the deceitful principle of shared responsibilities
3. Our rejection of promoting carbon markets that are not responsive and do not serve the climate justice imperatives for Africa.
4. Our resounding commitment to a just and equitable transition to renewable energy, ensuring that energy access is prioritised for the poor and marginalised and that community ownership and participation are guaranteed
5. Our unrelenting demand that developed countries fulfil their historical responsibility and provide adequate and predictable finance, technology transfer, and capacity building to support adaptation, mitigation, and loss and damage in Africa. guaranteed.
6. Continue to advance for shared and collective accountability on the part of African leadership in the advancing for positions that put the African people above all personal and collective political and economic interests.

STATE OF PLAY ON VARIOUS TRACKS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND KEY DEMAND

A. ADAPTATION

A.1. State of Play on Adaptation

- ◆ IPCC ARC6 report asserts that Africa will be impacted by climate change under all mitigation scenarios, setting a stage for agitation for concrete and accelerated adaptation actions to enable communities at the frontline of the crisis to cope with impacts of climate change that are now a reality.
- ◆ The Adaptation Gap Report 2023 clearly bolds out the key issues: - Underfinanced, Underprepared, and Inadequate investment and planning on climate adaptation which have not only left people exposed to face the full force of climate impacts without any shield but also defined the slow progress in adaptation efforts
- ◆ This unpreparedness is occurring in the context of climate vagaries. In 2023, climate change grew more disruptive and deadly, temperature records toppled, globally and regionally, storms, floods, heatwaves and wildfires caused devastation.
- ◆ Recent statistics point to the adaptation finance gap now standing at US\$194–366 billion per year, with adaptation finance needs in developing countries likely to be 10–18 times as great as finance flows – over 50 per cent higher than the previous range estimate.
- ◆ Finance needed to implement domestic adaptation plans in developing countries is currently estimated at US\$387 billion per year until 2030, most of which will require international support to deliver. Rationalized with the 15 per cent decline in adaptation finance flows to developing

countries in 2021 to around US\$21 billion, it is apparently clear that neither the goal of doubling 2019 international finance flows to developing countries by 2025 nor a possible new collective quantified goal for 2030 will significantly close the finance gap on their own.

- ◆ Whereas countries are making progress in developing policies, laws, regulations and programmes to anchor adaptation, there are gaps in creating a comprehensive ecosystem of policy framework, complete with financing arrangements
- ◆ Given that progress in adaptation implementation in developing countries is plateauing, with the number of adaptation actions supported through the four international climate funds being lower in 2022 than in the previous years, increasing gaps in the implementation of adaptation actions
- ◆ Noting that greater international public adaptation finance could still effectively reduce climate risks and deliver high benefits, for instance, studies indicate that US\$16 billion invested in agriculture per year would prevent about 78 million people from starving or chronic hunger because of climate change impacts.
- ◆ More than seven years since the Global Goal on Adaptation was established through the Paris Agreement at COP21, countries are yet to have proper guidance on what and how to track progress toward adaptation commitments, including national-level metrics and indicators that can facilitate effective monitoring and understanding of collective progress towards achieving the global goal on adaptation.

A.2.1: Key demands and asks on Adaptation

1. At COP28, Governments must agree on a robust, ambitious, and solutions-oriented outcome on the operationalization of the Global Goal on Adaptation to help accelerate adaptation action globally. The GGA framework should be complete with metrics and indicators to measure progress towards the implementation of this goal.
2. Call on COP28 to advance a decision that matches the ambition in mitigation to the ambition in adaptation. This ambition must be demonstrated through the financial commitments secured in COP28 for advancing adaptation which should be commensurate with the adaptation needs.
3. Call for a COP28 decision that is more than doubling of adaptation finance, with a time-bound road map on delivery of this commitment consistent with the needs and urgency of the adaptation response measures as highlighted in the Adaptation Gap Report
4. Call on Parties to the UNFCCC to centre National Adaptation Plans (NAPS) as the vehicle for delivery of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and specifically for African governments to ensure key sectors, notably, agriculture, water, ecosystems, health and other livelihood sub-sectors are at the centre of the NDC implementation while promoting synergies with other global processes, such as the Agenda 2030, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Sendai framework
5. Advance for decisions that promote the realization of Locally Led Adaptation (LLA) Actions for greater responsiveness of climate action to those at the frontline of climate and call on global leaders to demonstrate leadership in advancing LLA.
6. Call upon African governments to enhance and hasten adaptation planning, ensuring a comprehensive ecosystem of policies, laws, programmes and regulations, taking into account indigenous knowledge to mainstream adaptation in national development plans and strengthening implementation of National Adaptation Plans.
7. Invite the IPCC to establish a Task Force on Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Tracking, similar to the IPCC Task Force on GHG Inventories, to provide updated assessment methodologies on impacts and adaptation that could be used for GGA and GST, and ensure such institutions are

well anchored in Africa and with local scientist leading the assessments.

8. In line with the responsiveness of investments to the green growth agenda and aspirations of the AU Climate Response Strategy 2022 – 2032, call for a shift of emphasis from private sector investments from pure economic prosperity to human well-being and broaden their focus from financial targets to environmental, social, and governance impacts.
9. Urge the AUC to strengthen the continent's climate research capacities and capabilities to provide the evidence basis for position building and policy development at national, regional, and global scales. As such recommend strengthening and capitalizing on the Climate Research for Development (CR4D), bringing together national research and academic institutions, advocacy organisations, think tanks and other practitioners and creating a fund to enhance the effectiveness of these institutions
10. Adaptation must be premised high up as a global priority, with secure grant-based funding at the global level for accelerated adaptation action at scale, through new and additional finance, capacity and technology transfer across developing and less developed countries.
11. UNFCCC at COP28 advances decisions that centre vulnerability and risk analysis to advance for a transformational adaptation that delivers outcomes that deliver benefits across the mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage spectrum.

A.2.2. Specifically on Health

12. Call on the African Group of negotiators to promote the Common Africa Position on Climate change and Health, and with a bias to the adoption of a holistic approach to health that promotes broad-based response measures to climate change modelled along the One Health Approach and decentralized approaches to its implementation.
13. Advance for preventive and promotive health that strengthens ecosystem-wide approach to health, secure key determinants of health and advance Africa-centric, pro adaptation and enhances the resilience of African health systems.

A.2.3. Specifically on Agriculture

14. Pursue measures that accelerate access to climate finance for African countries to combat the adverse effects of climate change in the agriculture and food security sectors. In this regard, African countries and regions must work together in sharing best practices, knowledge, and experiences and mobilizing climate funds to scale, advancing cross-border programs, promoting renewable energy, strengthening early warning systems, and building resilient infrastructure using nature-based solutions.
15. We urge African countries to prioritize and anchor adaptation imperatives for the agriculture sector when reviewing their National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). To ensure priority funding for the agriculture sector, we encourage the demonstration of its adaptation and mitigation co-benefits and draw on funding from both mitigation and adaptation baskets to implement holistic actions in the sector.
16. Parties must agree on innovative/alternative sources of grant-based finance that can generate new and additional resources for climate action and adaptation in Agriculture, rooted in the principle of 'polluter pays' and UNFCCC's foundational principles of equity, justice, fairness, and access.
17. At COP28, global north countries should be urged to repurpose global food subsidies to major commercial producers for agroecology, food systems, and market reforms and make these funds available to smallholder farmers to advance sustainable systems of food production in developing countries.

18. The urgent need to provide the needed support to enhance African countries' capacities to carry out their sectoral assessments and analyse the impacts of response measures, including cross-border impacts, just transition and for impacts on trade, and competitiveness among others.
19. Call on Parties to UNFCCC to firm and tighten language on climate finance to health and agriculture to ensure global commitment for climate action in these two sectors is linked to the broad principles of the Paris Agreement rather than tasking countries to resource their plans on health and agriculture. African leaders' support to the Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action; and the COP28 Declaration on Climate and Health must be backed by a firm commitment by the North to fund these plans.

B. CLIMATE FINANCE

B.1. STATE AT PLAY ON CLIMATE FINANCE

- ◆ COP28 is taking place against a context in which Africa as a continent has fading optimism on commitments by the global communities to address the climate crisis, particularly in delivering much-needed climate finance and in grant form
- ◆ According to the IPCC, Africa has suffered annual losses of \$7 billion due to climate change between 2010 and 2019. If we continue with high-emissions scenarios, this figure could rise to \$50 billion by 2040. This could cause a 2-4% reduction in Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth per year by 2040 and a 10-25% reduction by 2100.
- ◆ Unfortunately, developing countries receive too little adaptation finance. According to the Adaptation Gap Report 2022, developing countries received international adaptation finance worth US\$28.6 billion in 2020, accounting for a 34% share of total climate finance to developing countries in 2020 and representing only a 4% increase from the previous year.
- ◆ The report also reveals that the adaptation needs are estimated to be USD 340 billion per year by 2030, which means that the costs could reach \$500 billion annually by 2050.
- ◆ It's therefore crucial to provide urgent finance specifically dedicated to adaptation, loss, and damage to help countries prepare for future displacement, livelihood disruption, and losses.
- ◆ Despite the Green Climate Fund being created to finance climate action, partly because business approach of multilateral development banks (MDBs), including the World Bank, most of the finance provided by these institutions comes in the form of loans for disaster recovery and reconstruction, which is unjust.
- ◆ Key question related to whether developed countries will restore the trust in the system – scaling up grant and concessional finance for developing countries. Scepticisms on whether replenishing GCF as fronted in COP28 will be a solution to developed countries and those at the frontline of the climate crisis
- ◆ Despite the slow flow, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that Africa may need up to \$86.5 billion annually by 2030 to adapt to climate change impacts, highlighting the urgency for measures that address the devastating effects of climate change on vulnerable communities.
- ◆ Many developing countries, particularly in Africa, are facing a growing debt burden that adversely affects their economic growth and development. This debt burden makes it challenging for them to invest in crucial areas, such as health, education, and infrastructure.
- ◆ An increasing number of people and coalitions around the world, from both the global north and south, who are willing to engage in constructive dialogue about the need for reform in the global

financial system (financial regulations, International Trade, Debt Restructuring) with aim of creating a financial system that is more sustainable, equitable and benefits everyone, not just a select few.

- ◆ Growing positioning of global capital in the climate finance ecosystem – the need for bigger and better international finance institutions (IFIs) who are fit for purpose to address both climate and development, scaling up concessional finance for adaptation and just transition of energy systems and MDBs to work as a system through country platform approaches.

B.2. KEY DEMANDS AND ASKS - CLIMATE FINANCE

1. Draw the attention of parties to the UNFCCC to the scale and magnitude of need on the ground and that Climate Finance should be in USD trillions, not Billions. Parties to UNFCCC must therefore recalibrate their climate financing ambition beyond the annual USD.100 billion, which they have been historically unable to honor
2. Call on developed countries to scale up access to climate finance for adaptation delivered to African countries through grants and must be new and additional to Official Development Assistance (ODA), based on their needs and special circumstances.
3. Call for an urgent audit of the financial climate debt in Africa and advance in the negotiation process decisions and deals that do not worsen the growing debt portfolio for African countries. The imperatives of climate justice and in regard to ensuring that Africa in its climate response is not economically colonized through debt must guide Africa's position and decisions in COP28.
4. Call on parties to the UNFCCC to deeply interrogate the common buzzwords including innovative finance and leveraging private sector financing and their potential implications in tilting public finance to further capitalistic interests in climate response, further denying communities at the frontline crisis the much-needed grant-based funding. To mitigate against this, we call on AGN to advance public finance, in grant form as critical for stimulating investment in areas of the economy that may not attract private investment, largely in adaptation.
5. Regarding the New Collective and Quantified Goal, pursue a climate finance architecture that secures massive scale-up of public funds in COP28 with clear quantum, both in amount and time
6. Call GCF as the mainframe mechanism for implementing financing decisions of UNFCCC to channel finance directly to national and subnational governments and local actors consistent with the principles of locally-led action to ensure that communities have direct access to funding for sustainable development and climate change.
7. Align with the effort to reach urgent conclusions on the modalities of operationalizing the loss and damage facility. The funding mechanisms should follow the principles of equity, and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), and should be party-driven, where decisions are agreed upon by consensus. The loss and damage fund should be grant-based, locally-led, broad-based, and adopt a whole society approach. Additionally, it should be gender-responsive and accessible to communities at the frontline of the climate crisis.
8. Given the growing prominence of MDBs, undertake institutional governance reform within the MDBs to ensure that governance is more equitable and representatives from all regions have equal decision-making power. A further call should be made to parties to UNFCCC at COP28 to advance reforms in practices and priorities of MDB to sustainably increase climate finance
9. Support Parties to UNFCCC to accelerate negotiations on a New Collective and Quantified Finance Goal, which should pave the way for predictable, adequate, and flexible climate finance to vulnerable countries and communities.

C. LOSS AND DAMAGE

C.1. STATE AT PLAY LOSS AND DAMAGE

- ◆ Africa continues to grapple with loss and damage across the year, resulting in deaths, loss of livelihoods, essential infrastructure and eroding development gains previously secured
- ◆ Unfortunately Africa grappled with response measures to climate-triggered calamities with little support from developed countries, reallocating their meagre resources to climate response
- ◆ Disappointingly, the UNFCCC's Transitional Committee (TC5) adopted suboptimal recommendations on the operationalization of the new funding on loss and damage, key weaknesses centring on:
 - ▶ Proposing WB as the interim host
 - ▶ Lack of scale identified for the fund,
 - ▶ The weak language on sources of finance which fails to commit historical emitters to provide support but only urges them to do so while encouraging other countries to complement voluntarily.

C.2. KEY DEMANDS AND ASKS ON LOSS AND DAMAGE

1. While pushing for Institutional arrangements for L&D must be adopted in COP28, we oppose any institutional arrangements that place the loss and damage fund to to be hosted by the World Bank.
2. We call on the USA to STOP arm-twisting African countries and less developed countries on the funding arrangement for the L& D Facility
3. We reiterate the Paris Agreement Principles on equity, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and respective capabilities and call on developed and highly polluting countries, who are responsible for the current climate crisis to fund loss and damage.
4. We reiterate our rejection of the proposal for voluntary contribution to the Loss and Damage fund as advanced by developed countries.
5. Call on UNFCCC parties in COP28 to ensure operationalizing a fit-for-purpose Loss and Damage Fund at COP28 which is adequately resourced for remedies to address the full spectrum of loss and damage needs and is based on the equity principles of the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. Towards this end, parties must ensure the first replenishment call for the L&D facility is made in Dubai
6. Raising vital new and additional finance in the form of grants, not loans, to pay to address loss and damage, and strengthening legislation to embed the polluter pays principle into law whilst also propelling emission cuts;
7. At COP28, institutionalize policy frameworks that ensure that funding to address Loss and Damage gets to communities in need as quickly as possible, is locally led, gender-responsive and dependable.
8. Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD) must have sustainable, predictable and sufficient resources (financial, technical, and human resources) to ensure that the network will be responsive to parties through a demand-driven approach
9. At the COP28, the Network should be fully operationalized to implement the decision and to catalyze technical assistance that contributes to robust action and support to Africa and other vulnerable developing countries.

D. JUST TRANSITION & MITIGATION

D.1. STATE OF PLAY IN MITIGATION

- ◆ □ Scientists warn that we are staring at a time bomb that will explode if we don't decisively cut down our greenhouse gas emissions by 43% by 2030 to keep the 1.5 degrees Celsius goal alive.
- ◆ Even if the international community were to stop emitting all greenhouse gases today, it would take decades for the climate to stabilize, and climate disruption is here to stay for the long haul. Therefore the call for rapid, deep, and sustained cuts in greenhouse gas emissions to limit future climate change risks to those least responsible for climate action is lauder
- ◆ Whereas mitigation is central to the COP28 outcome and to keeping 1.5°C within reach, the overarching narrative on phasing down on dirty energy, rather than phasing out does not inspire hope but rather continues to support inevitable investments in fossil fuels is inevitable
- ◆ COP28 will attempt a bold move to push for measures to collectively cut 22 gigatons of GHG emissions in the next 7 years to keep 1.5°C within reach, premised on scaling up renewables, which is an important signal but may not inspire hope in Africa, given the transition is unlikely to be just and will sink the continent in more debt.
- ◆ COP28's Presidency pledge to endorse the tripling of global renewables capacity and doubling of the annual average global rate of energy efficiency improvements between now and 2030 (reaching 4%), and to come to COP with tangible commitments to realize this goal is a welcome pronouncement, though premised on national level action, some lacking the financial capacity.
- ◆ Nevertheless, it seems global negotiations are still promising hope on a host of false solutions, notably scaling investments in carbon capture, utilization, and storage, and low-carbon hydrogen and now the emotive carbon markets.

Transitional minerals

- ◆ Africa is the epitome of the sad reality of the "natural resource curse", where Africa's mineral riches fail to optimally contribute to meaningful, inclusive, competitive socio-economic transformation, which must be avoided at all costs this time around.
- ◆ Africa's critical minerals value chain can generate immense socioeconomic benefits, particularly noting powering Africa's economic growth using clean, renewable energy could lead to a 6.4% higher GDP, 3.5% more economy-wide jobs, and a 25.4% higher welfare index between 2020 and 2050. Cumulatively, transitioning to net zero by 2050 is projected to create up to \$26 trillion in growth opportunities and 65 million new jobs by 2030.
- ◆ With up to 30% of global mineral reserves being in Africa, including those essential for powering this transition, Africa's place and space in this global transition remains unsecured. Weak governance, environmental and social standards, and human rights violations expose Africa to significant challenges related to water pollution, land degradation, biodiversity loss, and social conflicts..

D.2.1 Key asks on mitigation

1. We reject this politically convenient language of phasing down from abated fossil fuels, as currently propagated and call upon developed countries to demonstrate leadership through political pronouncement at COP28, and a firm plan for phasing out of fossil fuels.
2. Call on UNFCCC to urgently introduce and monitor enforcement of policies, laws and programmes by developed and highly emitting countries to reduce emissions in line with the 1.5C temperature goal;

3. Call for decisions in COP28 that match ambition in mitigation actions and ambition in Adaptation investments
4. Call for scrutiny of the Hydrogen Declaration and revisiting the prospects offered by Hydrogen as a source of transitional and green energy in the medium and long term horizon to avoid asset stranding
5. Call on developed countries to accelerate measures limiting subsidies for fossil fuels, speeding up permitting processes, incentivizing scaling people-centred off-grid investments in energy-accelerating storage technologies and ensuring access to clean energy

D.2.2. Key demands and asks on transitional minerals

1. Recognize the role of transitional minerals in the just transition and call upon African leadership to strive to implement a plan that enables the continent to benefit from the growth opportunity of \$26 trillion worth of transitional minerals
2. Exploitation of potential presented by transitional minerals should be devoid of human rights violations and environmental injustices
3. Regulate and monitor the scale and quantum of minerals exploited to curb greedy exploitation of transitional minerals happening in many countries in Africa
4. Urge African governments to strengthen their governance and regulatory frameworks, diversify their economies, enhance their value addition and beneficiation capacities, and foster regional cooperation and integration to benefit from transition minerals value chains
5. Exploitation of transitional minerals should STOP be another source of Climate Insecurity that Africa is experiencing

E. JUST TRANSITION WORK PROGRAMME PATHWAYS

E.1: STATE OF PLAY

Decision 1/CMA.4 in paragraph 52 establishes a work programme on the Just Transition and scopes the discussion as being on ‘... pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1, in the context of Article 2, paragraph 2 ...’ COP 28 is expected to agree on elements of the work programme including scope, modalities, time frames and outcomes.

E.2. OUR KEY DEMANDS

1. 1. The objective of the work programme should be to discuss pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1, in the context of Article 2, paragraph 2, with a view to adopting decisions to support the implementation of just transitions and efforts to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication more effectively
2. The work programme can therefore be seen as a means of operationalising equity in the pathways for mitigation, adaptation and finance under the Paris Agreement and paragraph 52 sets a tone of the relevance of equity or ‘justness’ of the transition as critical to ambition
3. On Scope, the work programme should be comprehensive in line with the mandate of the work programme – Just and equitable mitigation, just adaptation, resilience and financing for the Just transitions including increasing access to finance and technology. This is in the context of equity and **CBDR&RC**

4. The Work Programme should be under a joint SBI and SBSTA Joint Contact group or informal consultations), include workshops/exchanges; and link with the annual high-level Ministerial dialogue- to give political guidance
5. On Linkages, we believe that the Work programme on Just transition pathways has distinct mandate. In order to understand the ongoing relevant work, there might be an opportunity to get updates from other relevant processes - GST, MWP, finance- NCQG, KCI/ Forum, adaptation -GGA- to understand any linkages and areas for complementarity
6. On timelines, the work programme should be run till 2028 to input into the next GST and review thereafter, with the outcome and outputs of the Work Programme being annual CMA decisions.

F. CARBON MARKETS

F.1. STATE OF PLAY CARBON MARKETS

Real, proven, community-centred, cost-effective solutions to justly address the climate crisis are increasingly being swept aside in favour of industry-banked, risky, expensive, and harm-inducing false solutions. Climate justice begins with ending financing for and promotion of these false solutions.

1. Carbon Markets allow CDR technologies to bypass external regulations related to rights, safety and biodiversity. They provide an easy excuse for the fossil fuel industry, high-polluting businesses and governments to continue as normal. Carbon market advocates (economics-minded) and engineers (with huge gaps and limitations in their claims) steer the climate ambition conversation.
2. After almost 20 years of carbon trading, it is clear that market-based mechanisms do not work. Rather, this fundamentally flawed approach incentivises the private sector to profit from non-transparent systems. Carbon markets/pricing systems should be eliminated and a plan to phase out fossil fuels should be foregrounded before it is too late.
3. Safeguards have not protected Indigenous Peoples from the predatory and land-grabbing practices of the carbon brokers, conservation NGOs, carbon market managers, banks and states - forming what is being termed as carbon colonialism. Indigenous Peoples have inherent sovereignty and jurisprudence over their territories.
4. The private sector administrates the voluntary markets and is making billions of dollars on a fake commodity that ends up void or with harm. Including the private sector carbon mafia in any UN system undermines any action on climate change. New start-ups enter the conversations as demonstrated experts rather than as opportunists with unproven technology.
5. Carbon Markets promote the idea that carbon removed can be accurately monitored and verified, or that they are permanent, or that the emissions produced and resources used in the whole lifecycle of a removal project is very little and allowable within our carbon budget.

F.2. KEY DEMANDS ON CARBON MARKETS

1. We reject carbon markets and their propagation as means for addressing Africa's climate finance needs for Africa as they are a false solution.
2. In the interim, we call on the African Group of Negotiators to advance a position in the negotiation process that strengthens the accountability imperatives in the carbon markets, ensures greater financial flow from the carbon markets mechanism to the continent and greater control of decision-making by communities and governments of Africa
3. Call on African governments to centre the rights and sovereignty of African people in future

engagement with consideration of phasing out from the carbon markets as they are not supportive of the realization of resilience goal in Africa and are undermining climate ambition on cutting down on emissions.

4. We call on UNFCCC and human rights bodies of the UN to expedite investigations into numerous cases of human rights violations and land grabbing cases that are dotting Africa and largely driven by carbon investments and initiate urgent remediation measures to these violations

G. GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

G.1. STATE AT PLAY IN GST

- ◆ This takes place at a time when some pillars of the Paris Agreement have not clearly defined their goals, and indicators of assessing progress, notable, the global goal on adaptation and loss and damage
- ◆ The negotiation process on GST largely acknowledges the lack of progress in implementing the goals of the Paris Agreement, alarmingly in reducing global emissions as global temperatures rise.
- ◆ The GST process acknowledges the critical issues in climate finance but does not address the significant gap between commitments and disbursements.
- ◆ Overall, through the GST process, there is a growing call for greater accountability for climate action by all stakeholders across all cadres and beyond UNFCCC mechanisms. Strengthening adaptation commitments is part of this call for accountability

G.2. KEY ASKS ON GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

1. Call on African governments to pursue greater accountability in climate action through entrenched stocktake processes at the country level that harness perspectives of communities at the frontline of the climate crisis. Towards this end, African governments must secure the participation of communities at the front line of the climate crisis through institutionalized national-level audits.
2. African governments, in COP28 and through the GST process pursue clear goals on Adaptation and Loss Damage, complete with clear goals, matrices of assessment including targets and indicators of assessment of progress towards goals to make the GST process highly relevant to the aspirations of the continent.
3. Call on parties to UNFCCC, through the GST to pursue ambitions global commitments and targets across all performance areas in pursuit of scaled mitigation, adaptation and financing commitments

GET IN TOUCH

Panafrican Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA)



Continental Secretariat, J13
Kabarnet Road, Off Ngong Road
P. O. Box 51005 00200
Nairobi, Kenya



+254 20 8075808



info@pacja.org



www.pacja.org

